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POLICE OFFICER KEITH WHITE; 
JOHN DOES 1-10  
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_______________ 
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Before:   FISHER, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., 
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_______________ 
 
James E. Hockenberry, Esq.   [ARGUED] 
Law Office of Leon Aussprung 
2005 Market Street – Ste. 2300 
Philadelphia, PA   19103 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Jane L. Istvan, Esq.   [ARGUED] 
Mark Maguire, Esq. 
Amanda C. Shoffel, Esq. 
City of Philadelphia 
Law Department 
1515 Arch Street – 17th Fl. 
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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Lizette Vargas challenges an order from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granting summary judgment against her on her 
constitutional and state-law claims against the City of 
Philadelphia (“the City”) and two Philadelphia police officers 
(collectively, with the City, the “City Defendants”).  She 
brought those claims on her own behalf and on behalf of the 
estate of her daughter, Tabitha Gonzalez, based on events 
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associated with Tabitha’s death from asthma.  Although the 
underlying circumstances of the case are tragic, the District 
Court’s legal conclusion was correct, and we will affirm.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background1 
 
 On the night of August 19, 2009, shortly before 
midnight, 15-year old Tabitha began suffering from an 
asthma attack while at her home in North Philadelphia.  Her 
mother, Ms. Vargas, who was also at home, suggested that 
she use her inhaler and nebulizer.  While Tabitha was using 
the nebulizer, the severity of the asthma attack prompted 
Vargas to call 911 for emergency assistance.   
 
 As she waited for the paramedics to arrive, Vargas 
went outside and found Tabitha lying on the sidewalk in front 
of the house.  At first, Tabitha was conscious and gasping for 
air, but she quickly lapsed into unconsciousness.  Tabitha’s 
cousin Maritza Rojas performed CPR on her, but it was 
unsuccessful.  Erik Franklin – Maritza’s boyfriend –and two 
neighbors lifted Tabitha into the backseat of a car belonging 
                                              
 1 We note the conflicting stories emerging from the 
interaction Vargas had with the police, but we construe the 
facts in the light most favorable to her, the party opposing 
summary judgment.  Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012) (“When reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment the court must view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 
inferences in that party’s favor.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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to Julia Diaz, another of Tabitha’s cousins, so that Diaz could 
take her to the hospital.  During this time, Vargas and Diaz 
both dialed 911, placing five separate and understandably 
frantic calls between 12:08 a.m. and 12:14 a.m.  In response 
to a report of “a person screaming” made at 12:10 a.m. and 40 
seconds, the Police Communications Center dispatched police 
officers Keith White and Matthew Blaszczyk at 12:11 a.m. 
and 16 seconds.2  (App. at 152-54, 157.)  Neither officer was 
made aware that the call was regarding a medical 
                                              
 2 A “computer-aided dispatch” (or “CAD”) report is 
generated by the police communications center when a 
dispatcher receives a 911 call.  The computer system records 
information related to the call, including police response and 
activity.  For example, it notes when officers input 
information in the computer terminal located in their patrol 
vehicle, called a mobile data transmitter (“MDT”).  The 
officers push a button on the MDT to report when they are en 
route to a location and when they have arrived.   
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emergency.3  The police dispatch report notes that the officers 
arrived at Vargas’s home at 12:13 a.m. and 56 seconds.4      
 
 The events immediately following the arrival of 
Officers White and Blaszczyk are in dispute.  Vargas testified 
that Franklin and Tabitha were in the backseat of Diaz’s car 
while Vargas was in the front passenger seat and Diaz, as the 
driver, had pulled the car partly out of its parking spot at the 
curb when the police officers stopped their car so that it 
blocked Diaz’s.  According to Vargas, the officers’ vehicle 
was positioned so that its back door prevented her from 
opening her passenger-side door.  She claims that, as an 
officer approached, she banged on her door to “let [the 
                                              
 3 Calls are coded as “a person screaming” when the 
dispatcher is unable to communicate with the person on the 
line and the operator can only hear screaming.  Other 911 
calls made by Ms. Vargas that night were coded for “hospital 
cases,” i.e., medical emergencies, and referred to the Fire 
Department for a response.  (App. at 151, 153.)  There was 
evidence that the 911 computer system cross referenced the 
medical emergency calls with the report of the woman 
screaming, but that information was not communicated to the 
officers who responded to the call.   
 
 4 According to the CAD report, the “on scene” button 
on the MDT registered to Officers Blaszczyk’s and White’s 
patrol vehicle was pushed at 12:13 and 56 seconds.  See supra 
note 2.  Vargas notes, however, that police records show the 
officers ran a vehicle tag at 12:13 and 42 seconds, suggesting 
that they arrived slightly before the time at which they pushed 
the “on scene” button.   
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officer] know that [she could not] open up the door,” while 
Diaz rolled down her window and told the officer that they 
had Tabitha in the car and had to leave immediately.  (App. at 
85.)  Vargas testified that, as Diaz was trying to explain their 
medical emergency, the officer walked in front of Diaz’s car 
to the driver’s side and said, “get the f*** out of the car, turn 
off the engine now.”  (App. at 86.)  Diaz then turned off the 
engine and got out of the car.  Because Vargas could not open 
her passenger-side door, she climbed over the center console 
and got out of the car through the driver-side door that Diaz 
had left open.  At that point, Vargas said, the police officer 
pulled open one of the back doors, causing Tabitha to tumble 
partway out of the car and onto the ground.  Vargas 
immediately attempted to move towards her daughter but was 
prevented from doing so by one of the officers, who, she said, 
“blocked” her.  (App. at 87.) 
 
 Officers White and Blaszczyk testified that they did 
not impede the movement of any car when they pulled to a 
stop in front of the Vargas residence.  They also claim that 
Tabitha was already on the sidewalk upon their arrival.  
Officer Blaszczyk testified that he saw “a female laying on 
the sidewalk” (App. at 296-97) as he got out of the patrol car, 
and Officer White similarly said he observed “two Hispanic 
males that were over top of a[] Hispanic female who was on 
the ground” (App. at 168).  The officers assert that, along 
with the two Hispanic males, they attempted to move Tabitha 
into the car and “got her halfway into the car and she just 
didn’t fit into the back door.”  (App. at 168.)  Officer White 
testified that, as they were attempting to move Tabitha into 
the car, he heard the siren of an ambulance coming and “it 
was very clear [to him] that [they] were not going to get 
[Tabitha] into the back of the car and [so he] recommended 
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that [they] wait for the ambulance to arrive” because he could 
see it coming down Fifth Street.  (App. at 168-69.)  Officer 
White further explained that, “[a]s the ambulance was pulling 
up, the two females were screaming at [him and Officer 
Blaszczyk] that [if they did not] want to f***ing help, to get 
the f*** away from [Tabitha].”  (App. at 169.)  Officer White 
claims he stepped away from them and approached the 
ambulance as it arrived.  Both officers assert that they did not 
prevent anyone from taking Tabitha to the hospital.     
 
 Acknowledging that she could not “be precise on the 
minutes,” Vargas estimated that the police officers were on 
the scene for approximately 6 to 8 minutes before the 
ambulance arrived.  (App. at 89.)  Franklin – one of Vargas’s 
witnesses – testified, however, that the officers were on the 
scene for “[m]aybe a minute, two minutes” before the 
ambulance arrived.  (App. at 132.)  Further, the 
contemporaneous police dispatch records indicate that, from 
the time the officers noted their arrival at the scene, see supra 
note 4, to the time the ambulance arrived, was just over one 
minute.5  (Compare App. at 158 (officers arrived at 
                                              
 5 As described by Vargas’s witnesses, the ambulance 
arrived “almost simultaneously” with Emergency Medical 
Technicians (“EMTs”) who came in a fire truck.  The EMTs 
later recalled that they saw a large crowd of people at the 
scene who were “[s]creaming, hollering, fighting … amongst 
each other” and also that Tabitha was “half-in” the car and 
was unresponsive with no vital signs.  (App. at 203-04.)  
They pulled Tabitha out of the car and onto the sidewalk and 
provided basic life support and CPR to her until the 
paramedics arrived.  The EMTs do not figure further in the 
unfolding of events nor in the legal controversies at issue. 
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12:13:56), with App. at 277 (ambulance arrived at 12:15).)  
After their arrival, paramedics assisted Tabitha onto a 
stretcher, loaded her into the ambulance and provided CPR to 
her on the way to Temple University Hospital.6  She arrived 
at the hospital at 12:28 a.m. and 31 seconds, approximately 
twenty minutes after Vargas’s first call to 911.  She had 
suffered a severe anoxic brain injury by the time of her 
arrival, was pronounced brain dead, taken off of life support, 
and died two weeks later on August 26, 2009.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 Vargas initially filed a complaint on April 1, 2011, in 
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, asserting claims 
against the City and officers of the Philadelphia Police 
Department listed as John Does 1-10.  The City timely 
                                                                                                     
 
 6 There are two different types of ambulances that 
respond to 911 calls: those with Advanced Life Saving 
Service (“ALS”) crews and those with Basic Life Saving 
Service (“BLS”) crews.  ALS crews include paramedics who 
can intubate patients and perform other advanced medical 
treatments, while BLS crews can only provide basic life 
support.  Vargas’s 911 call was initially coded for the 
dispatch of an ALS crew but, at the time she called, all ALS 
crews were responding to other calls and a BLS crew was 
dispatched instead.  The paramedics that arrived were thus 
only able to connect Tabitha to an automated external 
defibrillator and keep her airway open with a small piece of 
plastic.  Vargas does not contend that the unavailability of an 
ALS crew gives rise to any cause of action against the City 
Defendants.  
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removed the case to federal court.   Vargas then filed an 
amended complaint on August 18, 2011, naming Officers 
Blaszczyk and White as additional defendants and asserting 
in Count I that the officers violated her Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to be free from unlawful seizure and 
physical restraint and her right to seek medical care on 
Tabitha’s behalf, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  She also 
claims, in Count II, that the officers violated Tabitha’s right 
to be free from unlawful seizure, physical restraint, and cruel 
and unusual punishment and that they interfered with her 
“well-being, life and personal security” and substantive due 
process rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The 
amended complaint also contains, in Count III, a claim 
against the City alleging a failure to properly train the police, 
and, in Count IV, state-law false imprisonment claims on her 
own behalf and for Tabitha.   
 
 After the close of discovery, the City moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that Vargas could not 
demonstrate a constitutional violation and, in the alternative, 
that the officers’ conduct was shielded by qualified immunity.  
Vargas responded by pointing to the report submitted by her 
expert witness, Dr. Christopher Moen, an emergency room 
physician, who said that, had Vargas been able to take 
Tabitha to the hospital in Diaz’s car without interruption from 
the police, Tabitha would have arrived at the hospital 6 to 8 
minutes earlier than she did in the ambulance.7  According to 
                                              
 7 The 6 to 8 minute delay that Dr. Moen identified was 
based on police dispatch and hospital records, not on 
Vargas’s recollection of the timing of events.  Dr. Moen 
determined that Tabitha was placed in Diaz’s car at 12:13 
a.m. and that the time required to drive to the hospital from 
 10 
 
Dr. Moen, that 6 to 8 minute delay “prevented [Tabitha] from 
receiving life-saving medical care” and “caused her to suffer 
a significant anoxic brain injury which led to designation of 
brain death.” (App. at 377-79.)  The District Court granted 
summary judgment against Vargas on all of her claims, 
including granting judgment sua sponte on the false 
imprisonment claims.  Vargas then timely filed this appeal. 
 
                                                                                                     
Vargas’s home was 3 minutes and 42 seconds.  Thus, Dr. 
Moen concluded that, had Vargas been able to transport 
Tabitha to the hospital as intended, Tabitha would have 
arrived no later than 12:17 a.m.  Dr. Moen noted that the 
Emergency Medical Services report indicates that the 
ambulance arrived at the hospital at 12:23 a.m., while the 
hospital records indicate that that ambulance arrived at 12:25 
a.m.  Thus, Dr. Moen concluded that the delay in Tabitha’s 
treatment was approximately 6 to 8 minutes.  
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II. DISCUSSION8   
 
A. Unreasonable Seizure  
 
1. Seizure of Vargas and Tabitha 
 
Vargas argues that the District Court erred in finding 
that neither she nor her daughter was seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  A Fourth Amendment 
seizure occurs when the government terminates the freedom 
of an individual through means intentionally applied.  Brower 
v. Cnty. of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989).  In other 
words, “a person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical 
force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is 
restrained.”  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 
(1980).  The test for the existence of a “show of authority” is 
an objective one and, as the Supreme Court stated in 
California v. Hodari, considers “not whether the citizen 
perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, 
but whether the officer’s words and actions would have 
conveyed that to a reasonable person.”  499 U.S. 621, 628 
(1991).  A seizure does not occur, however, when the 
individual does not yield or submit to the officer’s show of 
                                              
8 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1367, and 1441.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s summary judgment rulings.  Lupyan v. 
Corinthian Colls. Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2014).  A 
party is entitled to summary judgment when “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
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authority.  Id. at 626; see also United States v. Smith, 575 
F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2009).  The kinds of demonstration of 
authority that may constitute a seizure include “the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person 
of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be 
compelled.”  United States v. Crandell, 554 F.3d 79, 85 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).  
 
 Vargas argues that both she and Tabitha were seized 
when the officers used their police cruiser to block Diaz’s car 
from leaving for the hospital, when the officers told Diaz to 
turn off the engine and instructed the occupants to get out of 
the car, and then when the officers prevented them from 
getting back in the car and leaving for the hospital after it was 
clear that a medical emergency was taking place.9  Vargas 
                                              
 9 As to seizure by physical force, Vargas did not argue 
below that she was seized when the police officers used their 
patrol car to block Diaz’s vehicle from leaving for the 
hospital.  Instead, she argued that she was seized when the 
officers refused to allow her to approach her daughter.  She 
makes passing references to that argument here, but, as the 
District Court concluded, it fails because the officers did not 
employ any physical force: they did not physically touch or 
restrain her and instead simply told her to “move back” away 
from her daughter and to “calm down.”  (App. at 87.)  See 
Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625 (“[The alleged seizure] does not 
involve the application of any physical force; Hodari was 
untouched by Officer Pertoso at the time he discarded the 
cocaine.”).  Although the officers’ conduct could have been 
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contends that the officers’ conduct constituted a show of 
authority to which she submitted, and she contrasts her and 
Tabitha’s behavior with that of the defendant in Hodari, who 
fled from police and was thus not seized because of his lack 
of submission to the officers’ authority.  Hodari, 499 U.S. at 
626.  Vargas emphasizes that she and Tabitha did not flee.  
Indeed, she says, despite desperately pleading with the 
officers to allow her to take her daughter to the hospital, she 
obeyed when they told her to get out of the vehicle and move 
away from Tabitha.   
 
 Although the parties devote significant effort to 
addressing the difficult question of whether a seizure 
occurred in this case, we need not resolve that issue because, 
as explained below, even if there were a seizure, the 
undisputed facts show that any such seizure was reasonable 
and therefore not a constitutional violation.   
 
2. Reasonableness of seizures 
 The Fourth Amendment does not protect against all 
seizures; it only protects against those that are unreasonable.  
                                                                                                     
sufficient under the “show of authority” prong to constitute a 
seizure, as discussed below, see infra pp. 11-17, any such 
seizure was reasonable.  
 Vargas also contends that the District Court erred in 
concluding that Tabitha was not seized because, in her 
unconscious state, she could not submit to the officers’ show 
of authority.  Again, because any seizure that may have 
occurred was reasonable, we do not need to resolve whether 
there was a seizure.  
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United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).  
Reasonableness is determined by balancing “the need of law 
enforcement officials against the burden on the affected 
citizens and considering the relation of the policeman’s 
actions to his reason for stopping the [individual].”  Baker v. 
Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1192 (3d Cir. 1995).  While 
declining to concede that any seizure occurred, the City 
Defendants argue that, to the extent there was a seizure, it was 
reasonable under the community caretaking exception to the 
Fourth Amendment.  
 
In Cady v. Dombrowski, the Supreme Court introduced 
the “community caretaking doctrine” when it held that a 
police search of a particular police officer’s private vehicle 
for the officer’s missing service revolver was not a Fourth 
Amendment violation because the search was undertaken not 
for a law enforcement purpose but out of “concern for the 
safety of the general public who might be endangered if an 
intruder removed a revolver” from the vehicle.10  413 U.S. 
                                              
 10  We have previously given a synopsis of the relevant 
facts in Cady, as follows: 
In Cady, a Chicago police officer named 
Dombrowski was visiting in Wisconsin and 
reported to the local police that he had been in 
an automobile accident.  The police picked him 
up and returned to the scene of the accident.  
Dombrowski had been drinking, appeared 
intoxicated to the officers, and offered 
conflicting versions of the accident.  He 
informed the local officers that he was a 
Chicago policeman.  The local officers believed 
that members of the Chicago police force were 
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433, 447 (1973).  The Court noted that law enforcement 
officers often exercise “community caretaking functions, 
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute.”  Id. at 441.  That community caretaking doctrine, as 
described in Cady, is an exception to the warrant requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment and allows police with a non-law 
enforcement purpose to seize or search a person or property 
                                                                                                     
required to carry a service revolver at all times, 
so, when no gun was found on Dombrowski’s 
person, an officer checked the front seat and the 
glove compartment of the wrecked car, but to 
no avail.  The effort to find the weapon was 
motivated by the obligation of the police “to 
protect the public from the possibility that a 
revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps 
malicious hands.”  The police had the vehicle 
towed to a privately owned garage, where it was 
left parked outside.  After taking Dombrowski 
to a local hospital for treatment of injuries he 
sustained in the accident, one of the Wisconsin 
officers returned to Dombrowski’s car to again 
try to recover the service revolver … pursuant 
to standard departmental procedure “to protect 
the public from a weapon’s possibly falling into 
improper hands.”  Upon opening the trunk, the 
officer discovered various items that linked 
Dombrowski to a murder. 
Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted). 
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“in order to ensure the safety of the public and/or the 
individual, regardless of any suspected criminal activity.”  
United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir. 1993).   
 
 Many courts, including our own, have considered the 
limits of the community caretaking doctrine.  In Ray v. 
Township of Warren, Ray’s estranged wife had gone to Ray’s 
house to pick up their daughter for court-ordered visitation.  
626 F.3d 170, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2010).  Upon seeing someone 
moving inside the home, but receiving no response to her 
ringing of the doorbell or knocking on the door, the wife 
called the police.  Id.  Once the police arrived, she described 
the situation to them and expressed concern for her daughter’s 
well-being.  Id.  The officers, some of whom were aware of 
the acrimonious divorce proceedings and child-custody 
dispute between the couple, also knocked on the door and 
called the telephone number for the residence, but received no 
response.  Id.  Thereafter, and without a valid warrant,11 the 
officers entered the house to check on the child’s well-being.  
Id.  To justify their actions, the officers asserted the 
                                              
 11 Prior to entering, the responding officers contacted a 
municipal court judge for guidance as to whether the officers 
could enter the home and look for the child without a warrant, 
and they received approval.  Although the specifics of that 
conversation were unclear, the officers testified that they only 
sought advice regarding entering the home out of concern for 
the daughter’s well-being; they did not regard the call as a 
request for a warrant.  The magistrate judge however, 
understood the officers to be asking for an arrest warrant and 
issued such a warrant, though it was later voided.  Ray, 626 
F.3d at 172. 
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community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement.   
 
 We ultimately held that the officers’ actions were 
protected by qualified immunity, id. at 179, but we declined 
to extend the community caretaking exception to cover the 
officers’ conduct.  Instead, we indicated that Cady’s outcome 
depended on the distinction in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence between automobiles and homes, and we 
concluded that the community caretaking doctrine “cannot be 
used to justify warrantless searches of a home.”  Id. at 177.  
We expressly noted in that case, however, that we were not 
deciding “[w]hether that [doctrine] can ever apply outside the 
context of an automobile search.”  Id.   
 
 Some of our sister courts of appeals have, by contrast, 
decided that question and have upheld under the community 
caretaking doctrine not only evidentiary searches and seizures 
outside the home, but also the effective seizure of persons.  
See, e.g., Lockhard-Bembery v. Sauro, 498 F.3d 69, 75-76 
(1st Cir. 2007) (applying community caretaking exception 
when officer ordered motorist to push her disabled car out of 
the roadway for the safety of the general public); Samuelson 
v. City of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(applying community caretaking exception when officers 
transported to a psychiatric hospital an unwilling individual 
who appeared to be hallucinating); United States v. Rideau, 
949 F.2d 718, 720 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying community 
caretaking exception when officers stopped defendant for his 
own safety and the safety of others after observing him 
standing in the middle of the road at night, dressed in dark 
clothes, and apparently intoxicated), vacated on other 
grounds, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).   
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 We agree that the community caretaking doctrine can 
apply in situations when, as is arguably the case here, a 
person outside of a home has been seized for a non-
investigatory purpose and to protect that individual or the 
community at large.12  The undisputed facts show that the 
actions of Officers Blaszczyk and White were reasonable.  
They were responding to a volatile situation which they did 
not initially know involved a medical emergency, and any 
brief seizure that may have occurred was a result of the 
officers’ concern for the safety of everyone involved.  The 
officers were sent because of a dispatcher’s report of a 911 
call from a “person screaming” (App. at 152-54), which was 
an apt description.  According to Vargas, when the officers 
pulled up next to Diaz’s car, the occupants of the car began 
“screaming” at them (App. at 85), but the screaming did not 
immediately reveal the nature of the emergency.  Once the 
officers realized that Tabitha needed medical attention, it was 
reasonable for them to direct Vargas to wait because an 
ambulance was within earshot and its arrival was apparently 
imminent.   
 
                                              
 12 The City Defendants have not invoked the 
“emergency aid doctrine,” which the Supreme Court 
describes as a subset of the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement.  Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“One exigency obviating the 
requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are 
seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”).   We thus 
do not have occasion to evaluate that doctrine’s applicability 
here.  
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 Officer White testified that they intended to take 
Tabitha to the hospital, but then heard and saw an ambulance 
approaching “within a minute or two minutes.”  (App. at 
175.)  He further testified that he waited for the ambulance 
because paramedics are “better trained” for the type of 
situation the officers faced.  (App. at 175.)  Sergeant Starrs of 
the Philadelphia Police Department, who works for the 
Department’s Research and Planning Unit and is responsible 
for writing policies and procedures used in the training of 
police officers, explained that officers are trained to wait for 
paramedics in certain situations because “medics … have the 
equipment and they have the personnel to ride in the back” 
with the patient, whereas when officers transport a patient, 
they “are in the front of the car driving” and “there is no 
nobody to attend to the patient in the back.”  (App. at 186.)  It 
is undisputed that Tabitha did in fact receive medical care on 
the scene and on board the ambulance on the way to the 
hospital.   
 
 Finally, it is important to note that the encounter 
outside the Vargas home transpired within a few minutes.  
Although Vargas estimated that the police officers were on 
the scene for 6 to 8 minutes before the ambulance, Franklin – 
one of her witnesses – testified that the time between the 
officers’ and the ambulance’s arrival was “maybe a minute, 
two minutes.”  (App. at 132-33.)  And the police dispatch 
records tend to confirm Franklin’s testimony, showing that 
the officers were on the scene just over a minute before the 
ambulance arrived.  (Compare App. at 158 (officers arrived at 
12:13:56), with App. at 277 (ambulance arrived at 12:15).)  
Even accepting the longer time-span as the historical fact, 
though, the entire episode happened quickly.  In such 
 20 
 
circumstances, even if Vargas and Tabitha could be 
considered seized, the seizures were reasonable.13   
 
B. Due Process Claim 
  
 Vargas also raises a Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process claim on her own behalf and on 
behalf of Tabitha.  For herself, Vargas argues that the officers 
violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to “make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control” of her daughter.  
C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Her claim on 
behalf of Tabitha has three components: a “straight” 
Fourteenth Amendment claim based upon the officers’ failure 
to allow Vargas to transport her to the hospital in violation of 
Tabitha’s right to life; a special relationship claim that the 
                                              
 13 The officers’ conduct here would also be shielded by 
qualified immunity.  “Qualified immunity shields government 
officials from civil damages liability unless the official 
violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly 
established at the time of the challenged conduct.”  Reichle v. 
Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012).  The case law does 
not indicate any analogous factual circumstances that would 
have put the officers on notice that they cannot briefly detain 
individuals in response to an emergency call and to await 
trained medical transport without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.  We had not, before today, expressly held that 
the community caretaking doctrine could justify the seizure of  
a person outside of a home, which suggests that, to the extent 
there was doubt, the law in this area was not “clearly 
established.” 
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officers had a duty to render affirmative aid; and a state-
created danger claim.   
 
 To sustain a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff 
must show that the particular interest in question is protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the government’s 
deprivation of that interest “shocks the conscience.”  Gottlieb 
ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 
172 (3d Cir. 2001).  The shocks-the-conscience test applies 
regardless of the theory upon which the substantive due 
process claim is premised.  See Estate of Lagano v. Bergen 
Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 858 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(noting that, to establish a claim under the state-created 
danger theory, a plaintiff must prove that “a state actor acted 
with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience”); 
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 809-12 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(applying the shocks-the-conscience test in a “special 
relationship” case); J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 
2010) (stating that, even assuming a “special relationship” 
existed, the plaintiffs “did not make out a substantive due 
process claim” because they did not “allege any behavior by 
defendants that would meet the legal definition of conscience-
shocking conduct”); Johnson ex rel. Estate of Cano v. 
Holmes, 455 F.3d 1133, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that 
the shocks-the-conscience standard applies to both “special 
relationship” cases and “state created danger cases” (citations 
omitted)).  
 
 “The exact degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach 
the ‘conscience-shocking’ level depends upon the 
circumstances of a particular case.”  Miller v. City of Phila., 
174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999).  A plaintiff faces the 
highest bar when the state actor accused of wrong-doing was 
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faced with a “‘hyperpressurized environment’” requiring a 
snap judgment.  Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 308-09 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 
508 (3d Cir. 2003)).  In such cases, we permit recovery only 
if the state actor had an actual intent to cause harm.  Id.  By 
contrast, “where deliberation is possible and officials have the 
time to make ‘unhurried judgments,’ deliberate indifference is 
sufficient.”  Id. at 309 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998)).  Importing aspects of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, we have defined “deliberate 
indifference” as requiring “conscious[ ] disregard [of] ‘a 
substantial risk of serious harm.’”  Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 
288 F.3d 57, 66 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 
511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).  In any event, “[m]ere negligence 
is not enough to shock the conscience.”  Sanford, 456 F.3d at 
311. 
 
  Here, the officers certainly did face a hyperpressurized 
environment.  They came in response to a 911 call noted 
simply as “person screaming” and they in fact encountered a 
group of screaming, frantic adults and an unconscious child.  
No one disputes that the police arrived at a tense and chaotic 
scene, that they endeavored to determine what was 
happening, and that, when it was plain that there was a 
medical emergency and an ambulance was about to arrive, 
they had everyone wait for the paramedics.  It is a stretch to 
say that these facts rise even to the level of negligence, let 
alone to deliberate indifference or an intent to harm.  While 
the officers’ behavior and language, as described by Vargas, 
may have been less than polite or compassionate, it was not 
actionable. 
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 The cases Vargas relies upon are inapposite.  In Rivas 
v. City of Passaic, paramedics misrepresented to the police 
that a patient had assaulted one of them, leading the police to 
restrain the patient and causing the patient to asphyxiate.  365 
F.3d 181, 185-86, 189 (3d Cir. 2004).  In Kneipp v. Tedder, 
police officers abandoned an intoxicated woman in freezing 
weather after separating her from her sober husband – her 
“private source of protection.”  95 F.3d 1199, 1210 (3d Cir. 
1996).  Here, by contrast, the officers simply and sensibly 
decided to wait for the incoming ambulance that was seconds 
away.  Unlike the government actors in the cases that Vargas 
cites, the police here assisted in a form of rescue – facilitating 
an ambulance pick-up – rather than arresting or abandoning 
the person in need of aid.  Thus, the District Court did not err 
in granting summary judgment against Vargas on all of her 
substantive due process claims. 
 
C. “Failure to Train” Claim 
 
 Relying on Monell v. New York City Department of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Vargas next contends 
that the City of Philadelphia is liable for failing to preserve 
her constitutional rights, and that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment against her on that claim.  
Specifically, she argues that the City’s police department 
failed to adequately train its police officers and failed to adopt 
appropriate policies to prevent Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations.   
 
 In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality 
can be found liable under § 1983 only when the municipality 
itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.  City of 
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).  In order 
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to impose liability on a local governmental entity for failing 
to preserve constitutional rights, a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 
claim must establish that: (1) she possessed a constitutional 
right of which she was deprived; (2) the municipality had a 
policy; (3) the policy “amount[ed] to deliberate indifference” 
to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was 
the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.”  Id. at 
389-91 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “‘[D]eliberate 
indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof 
that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious 
consequence of his action.”  Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan 
Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). 
 
 In this case, Vargas’s claim fails at the first step.  
Because the officers did not violate any of her constitutional 
rights, see supra pp. 9-17 (no Fourth Amendment violation), 
17-20 (no Fourteenth Amendment violation), there was no 
violation for which the City of Philadelphia could be held 
responsible.  Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 
F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is well-settled that, if 
there is no violation in the first place, there can be no 
derivative municipal claim.”).  The District Court thus did not 
err in granting summary judgment for the City on the Monell 
claim. 
 
D. False Imprisonment Claim 
 
 Finally, Vargas argues that the District Court erred in 
sua sponte granting summary judgment on the state-law false 
imprisonment claims that she raised on her own behalf and 
for Tabitha.  She does not appear to challenge the District 
Court’s finding that neither she nor Tabitha were falsely 
imprisoned and instead argues only that the District Court 
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should have provided her with notice and an opportunity to 
brief the issue before granting summary judgment against her 
on the claims.   
 
 Assuming that Vargas has not waived her argument on 
the underlying merits of the false imprisonment claims,14 she 
cannot succeed on those claims because the officers were 
entitled to immunity under Pennsylvania’s Political 
Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), 42 Pa. 
C.S. §§ 8541-8564.  The PSTCA provides immunity to 
municipalities and its employees for official actions unless 
the employee’s conduct goes beyond negligence and 
constitutes “a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful 
misconduct.”  Id. § 8550.  Willful misconduct has been 
defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as “conduct 
whereby the actor desired to bring about the result that 
followed or at least was aware that it was substantially certain 
to follow, so that such desire can be implied.”  Renk v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (quoting King v. 
Breach, 540 A.2d 976, 981 (Pa. 1988)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  As the record makes clear, the officers’ 
                                              
 14 “[U]nder Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
28(a)(3) and (5) and Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 
28.1(a), appellants are required to set forth the issues raised 
on appeal and to present an argument in support of those 
issues in their opening brief.  It is well settled that if an 
appellant fails to comply with these requirements on a 
particular issue, the appellant normally has abandoned and 
waived that issue on appeal and it need not be addressed by 
the court of appeals.”  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 
(3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  
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actions here do not rise to the level of willful misconduct and 
thus Vargas cannot prevail on her false imprisonment claims.  
It is therefore immaterial whether the District Court erred in 
sua sponte granting summary judgment without first giving 
Vargas notice, as any such error would be harmless.   
 
III. CONCLUSION  
 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the ruling of 
the District Court.  
